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TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION PROTECT A WITNESS AGAINST FORCED
PRODUCTION, OF DOCUMENTS?
This comment is intended to be a companion piece to the Comment
in- Vdnderbilf'Law .keview, Vol. I, No. Z1 which discusses self-incrimination
by means of physical disclosures. The preceding Comment gave a brief ac-
count of the privilege and pointed out that the Constitutions of the Federal
Government'aftd forty-six states have incorporated the common law privilege
against self-incrimination. The two exceptions among the states, Iowa and
New Jersey, have accepted the privilege, either by incorporation into their
common law by judicial interpretation, or by statute. It is the purpose of this
comment to discuss the possibility of the invocation 'of the privilege against
self-incrimination by an individual who has been ordered by regular legal
process to produce books, papers and other documents.
SCOPE
A witness may be compelled to produce documents in any case in which
he may be compelled to give oral testimony,2 and the same privileges against
self-incrimination which may be invoked by a witness who is called upon to
give oral testimony apply to a witness who is ordered to produce documents.8
From a study of the cases some general observations concerning the scope
of the privilege may be made which will be helpful to a further discussion of
the subject:
A. The privilege extends to testimony which incriminates the witness or
furnishes a link in the chain of evidence that may convict him or tend to
incriminate him.4 In this connection it may be remarked that the courts treat
testimony which might subject the witness to penalties or forfeiture as being
within the privilege.6
B. The privilege against self-incrimination is available to a witness only
1. Comment, To What Extent Does the Privilege Against Self-lincrimination Pro-
tect An Accused from Physical Disclosure? 1 VAND. L. REV. 243 (1948).
2. Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 9 (1830); Burnham v. Morrisey, 80 Mass.
(14 Gray) 226 (1859); see Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 17 Fed. Cas. 53,
Nb. 9, 448 (C.C.D. Mass. 1868) as to compelling production.
3. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) ; State v. Hollingsworth, 191 N.C.
595, 132 S.E. 667 (1926) ; People v. Zazove, 311 Ill. 198, 142 N.E. 543 (1924) ; Lamson
v. Boyden, 160 Ill. 613, 43 N.E. 781 (1896) ; Byass v. Sullivan, 21 How. Pr. 50 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1860).
4. ER parte Meyer, 18 S.W. 2d 560 (Mo. App. 1929); E.r parte Wilson, 39 Tex.
Cr. R. 630, 47 S.W. 996 (1898).
5. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Lamson v. Boyden, 160 Ill. 613, 43
N.E. 781 (1896) ; Bull v. Loveland, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 9 (1830)'; 8 WIG4OnaE, EVIDENCE
§ 2257 (3d ed. 1940).
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in cases of testimonial compulsion, "testimonial" referring to legal proceed-
ings in which oral or written words are extracted from a witness. 6 Boyd v.
United $tates7 qualified the preceding sentence somewhat by deciding that
where government officers obtained books and papers from an accused by an
illegal search and seizure, such a search violated not only the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, but also the Fifth, in that the ac-
cused was being forced to give evidence against himself by means of the
illegal search, aid thus he could assert the privilege against self-incrimination
to prohibit the use of such evidence, as well as the privilege against illegal
search and seizure. But it should be noted in this connection that where papers
of an accused were stolen by a private person, and turned over to the authori-
ties, the Supreme Court ruled that the privilege of the accused was not vio-
lated.8 The Court held that stolen documents were admissible in evidence
where there was no violation of petitioner's rights by governnzwnt authority,
although the documents were of an incriminating character.9 This comment
will not attempt to discuss the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure.
C. The privilege in question is a privilege against self-incrimination, and
if the witness is not subject to prosecution, he is not entitled to claim the
privilege. Therefore, where a statute provides that no witness shall be ex-
cused from testifying as to a particular matter, and that he shall not be sub-
jected to criminal proceedings because of any testimony which he may give,
the right to claim the privilege is denied the witness. A complete immunity
from prosecution is required and a provision that evidence given shall not
be used against the witness is not sufficient to replace his constitutional privi-
lege, because such a provision does not guard against the possibility that
"leads" may be gained from his testimony whereby other evidence against the
witness may be found.' 0
D. Sometimes peculiar circumstances will permit the courts to deny a
claim of privilege by a witness. An illustration is found in statutes which
require automobile drivers to stop at the scene of an accident in which they
are involved and give their name, address and similar pertinent information
to an officer, or to the injured party. In such cases it has been held that the
witness cannot claim the privilege against self-incrimination because the
state has required a waiver of the privilege in exchange for the right to use
the highways of the state."
6. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDEXCE § 2252e (3d ed. 1940).
7. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920).
8. Burdeau v. McDowell, 254 U.S. 465 (1921).
9. Accord, State v. Barrett, 121 Ore. 57, 254 Pac. 198 (1927).
10. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892) ; Hirsch v. State, 67 Tenn. 89 (1874).
11. People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115; 102 N.E. 530 (1913); 8 BLASHFIELD,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5399 (1935).
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PARTNERSHIPS
An individual is protected from the compulsory production of his private
documents as fully as from oral utterances.' 2 There seems to be no question
that partnership records are privileged. The instances in which compulsory
production of such documents has been sought are few.'3
In United States v. Brasley 14 three partners sought the return of part-
nership records which had been taken by government agents under circum-
stances amounting to an illegal seizure. The government contended that the
failure of one of the partners to protest the search and seizure amounted to a
waiver. The court doubted this contention but did not labor the point as
"They were the private documents of the three petitioners. No one of them
had any greater rights therein than each of the others." 15 All records, memo-
randa and photostats were ordered returned. The court continually referred
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, al-
though the case could have been disposed of on the Fourth alone.
In a later case ' 6 an internal revenue agent sought production of cor-
porate and partnership records. No issue was made as to corporate records,
but the respondent refused to produce the partnership records on the ground
that they might tend to incriminate him in pending criminal proceedings.
The petition was denied but without prejudice in order that the agent might
re-institute proceedings on completion of the criminal prosecution.
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that such documents
are private papers, and that the individual partner is privileged from their
compulsory production. The statement in the Brasley case that no partner
has any greater rights in the partnership records is true, but cannot be
pressed too far. There are apparently no cases 'where partner A has sought
to prevent partner B from producing records of the AB partnership. It is
submitted that A could not prevent their production or use. It. is quite true
that the documents are as much the property of A as they are the property of B,
but, if the documents were the sole property of A and were stolen by B and
turned over to the authorities, A could not assert the privilege.' 7 "A party is
privileged from producing evidence, but not from its production." 18
CORPORATIONS
That an individual may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination by
12. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13. Lisansky v. United States, 31 F. 2d 846 (C.C.A. 4th 1929), Cert. denied, 279
U.S. 873 (1929); Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1923);
United States v. Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
14. 268 Fed. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
15. Id. at 63.
16. Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1923).
17. Burdeaui v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
18. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
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refusing to submit his private papers to scrutiny is well settled.19 It is equally
well settled that a corporation may not assert the privilege.
2 0
The reasons most frequently advanced for denying a corporation the
privilege are:
1. A corporation is an artificial person as distinguished from a natural
person and is created for lawful purposes only;
2. A corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of the privilege;
3. The reserved visitorial power of the sovereign, i.e., the power to create,
implies the power to forfeit;
4. The policy behind the privilege is inapplicable to corporations.
The courts do not ordinarily select one of the above reasons to the ex-
clusion of the others. Sometimes they sedm to touch on all four reasons. It is
also to be noted that the reasons are not mutually exclusive. For example, the
first is included in the fourth.
A. A Corporation Is An Artificial Person As Distinguished from a
Natural Person.
The distinction between a natural person and the artificial, state-created
entity is often given as a basis for denying the privilege against self-incrimina-
to corporations.2 ' The individual exists for his own sake, has certain inalien-
able rights long antedating the formation of the government itself. He owes
society nothing as long as he refrains from infringing the rights of others.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
20. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) ; Essgee Co. v. United
States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; United States v. Cream
Products Distributing Co., 156 F. 2d 732 (C.C.A. 7th 1946); Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.
2d 278 (C.C.A. 3d 1946); Troy Laundry Co. v. Wirtz, 155 F. 2d 53 (C.C.A. 9th 1946).;
United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper
Co. v. News. Pub. Co., 174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919 (1921) ; Commonwealth v. Southern
Express Co., 160 Ky. 1, 169 S.W. 517 (1914); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 98
Miss. 159, 53 So. 489 (1910).
The English rule makes no distinction between a corporation and an individual.
"It is true that a company cannot suffer all the pains to which a real person is subject.
It can, however, in certain cases be convicted and punished, with grave consequences
to its reputation and to its members, and we can see no ground for depriving a juristic
person of those safeguards which the law of England accords, even to thd least deserving
of natural persons. It would not be in accordance with the principle that any person
capable of committing, and incurring the penalties of, a crime should be compelled by
process of law to admit a criminal offence." Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety
Glass Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 395, 409 (1938). See also Webster v. Sollowa r, Mills & Co.
[1931], 1 Dom. L.R. 831 (Alberta).
21. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News
Pub. Co., 174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919 (1921).
". .. there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a
corporation . .. the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incor-
porated for the benefit of the public." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). And
"While an individual may lawfully refu, se to answer incriminating questions unless pro-
tected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special
privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse
of such privileges." Id. at 75.
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On the other hand,. the corporation is an artificialentity ;'it is created for. a-
special purpose-to facilitate the transaction of lawfid business; When it fails
to perform the functions that led to its creation, its excuse for existence.ceases.
There is no capital punishment in the surrender of a corporate charter.
Therefore, "if a corporation has made a record by its books or papers that
shows it has violated the purposes for which it was created, 'why should not the
State, which gave it birth for legitimatep'urposes only, have the right, either
directly ... or indirectly ... tb inspect the 'ecord thus made ?" 22
This reasoning fails to consider the criminal capacity of the corporation. 23
Anciently, it was said by Holt 24 and Blackstone 25 that a corporation could
not commit a crime. It has been suggested that such statements are too broad 26
and that there probably never was a time when a corporation was free from
indictment.27 But even if that were not true, corporations eventually became
indictable for crimes of nonfeasance as distinguished from misfeasance.28
Later, courts found it unnecessary to use this distinction and drew the line
at crimes requiring specific intent or involving a special mental element. 29
There is authority to the effect that a corporation is not indictable for inten-
tional crimes, 30 but today the real dispute seems to center around intentional
crimes involving the element of personal violence. Corporations have been
convicted of involuntary manslaughter 31 but no case has been found convicting
a corporation of voluntary manslaughter or murder.
As the corporation is amenable to the criminal law where the penalty
provided is appropriate, this distinction alone does not seem to be a substantial
basis for denying corporations the privilege aganist self-incrimination.
B. A Corporation Is Not a Person Within the Meaning of the Privilege.
If the corporation is chargeable with criminal acts, is it a person within
the meaning of the privilege under discussion? This question poses two ad-
ditional ones. Is a corporation included within the protection of the privilege
at common law? Is it a "person" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?
Apparently the English courts believe that a corporation is within the
22. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., 174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919, 922
(1921).
23. 8 WIGo Eo, EVIDENc E § 2259 a (3d ed. 1940).
24. "A corporation is not indictable, but its particular members are." Anonymous, 12
Mod. 559, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1701).
25. "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its cor-
porate capacity: though its members may, in their distinct individual capacities." I BL.
Co.mm *476.
26. 10 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CoaRoRATioNs § 4942, n. 2 (rev. ed.,
Jones 1931).
27. Id. at § 4942.
28. Id. at § 4943.
29. Id. at § 4944.
30. Canfield, Corporate Responsibility~for Crime, 14 CoL.,L. REv. 469 (1914).
31. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); State v.
Lehigh Valley R.R, 94 N.J.L. 171, 111 Atl. 257 (1920) ; 5 MIN. L. REV. 74 (1920).
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protection of the privilege at common law.3 2 American ,courts hold that a
corporation cannot invoke .the privilege but do not make it clear whether they
mean at common law or under .the Fifth Amendment to th6 United States
Constitution. Hide v. Henkel-3 3 was the pioneer -case but sheds little light on
the problem. 3 4 Wilson v. United States 5 adopts the view that a corporation
is not within the protection of the-privilege at conimon law, 36 relying on Hale
v. Henkel.
37
Other state and federal courts have followed this lead. Some say that
the corporation is not a "person" within'the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
men; 38 others dispose of the problem with the cryptic statement that the
privilege has no application to corporations.3 9 In a lower federal court case
the only question before the court was whether or not a corporation was a per-
son within the,meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and the court said that
Hale v. Henkel and companion cases precluded consideration of the ques-
tion.40'
Regardless of the answers given to these questions, they do not seem to
furnish an adequate reason for denyink'tie privilege to corporations.
C. Reserved Visitoria Power of the Sovereign.
The reserved visitorial power of the sovereign is another reason advanced
for denying the privilege against self-incrimination to corporations. 41 What
32. Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 395
(1938).
83. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
34. "The question whether a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of this
.Amendment really does not arise, except perhaps where a corporation is called upon to
answer a bill of discovery, since it canonly be heard by oral evidence in the person -of
some one of its agents or employes." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (obviously
referring to oral testimony and not the production of documents).
For a contemporary analysis of this case written prior. to the case of Wilson v.
United States, see Proskauer, Corporate Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 11 COL.
L. Rkv. 445 (1911).
35. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
36. "It [c6rporation] cannot resist production on the ground of self-incrimination."
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911). ".
37. "This view, and the reasons which support it, have so recently been stated by
this court in the case of Hale v. Henkel .. . that it is unnecessary to do more than refer
to-what was there said.... ." Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-3 (1911).
38. Troy Lumber Co. v. Wirtz, 155 F. 2d 53 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); Standard Oil Co.
v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 9 F. 2d 453 .(S.D. I1. 1925) ; United States v. Goodner, 35
F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., 174 Wis.
107, 182 N.W. 919 (1921).
39. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).; Essgee Co. v.
United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; United States v. Cream Products Distributing Co.,
156 F. 2d 732 (C.C.A. 7th 1946) ; Porter v. Mueller, 156 F. 2d 278 (C.C.A. 3d 1946);
Grasselli Chemical Co. v. National Aniline Chemical Co., 282 Fed. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) ;
Commonwealth v. Southern Express Co., 160. Ky. 1; 169 S.W. 517 (1914) ; Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co. v..State, 98 Miss. '159, 53 So, 489 (1910).
40. Orvig Dampskibselskap v" New York and Bermudez Co., 229 Fed. 393 (E.D.N.Y.
1915).
41. "There .is a reserved right'in the legislature to investigate its contracts- and
find out whether it has exceeded its.powers. It would be. a. strange anomaly to hold that
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the state can give it can take away. The corporation "cannot resist produc-
tion upon the ground of self-incrimination. Although the object of the inquiry
may be to detect the abuses it has committed, to discover its violations of law
and to inflict punishment by forfeiture of franchises or otherwise, it must
submit its books and papers to duly constituted authority when demand is
suitably made. This is involved in the reservation of the visitorial power of
the State. .... , 42 State courts have voiced the same theory, 43 and courts
using this reasoning have also emphasized the distinction between the natural
person and the artificial entity.
4
The contention that the power to create implies the power to forfeit is
disarmingly logical. It advances a proposition difficult to attack, and appears
to many as the real basis for denying the privilege to corporations. But the
Supreme Court itself recently labeled this visitorial power as merely "a con-
venient vehicle for justification of governmental investigation of corporate
books and records." 45
D. The Policy Behind the Privilege Is Inapplicable to Corporations.
Professor Wigmore says that the policies behind the privilege against
self-incrimination are inapplicable to corporations. He advances two principal
reasons in support of this statement. "The first is that the sentiment of funda-
mental fairness, on which the privilege is in part based, applies only between
man And man. It is a sentiment which recoils from forcing another human
being to supply by his own act the incriminating evidence. It guards against
the abuses of physical compulsion which are apt to grow out of the license
to interrogate .... This sentiment and these dangers are not applicable when
the accused is not a human being but only an artificial entity." 46
His second reason is that a corporation virtually acts by written record
only, and, inasmuch as one of the primary purposes of the privilege is to
require the prosecutor to ferret out the information, to place a protective
cloak around corporate records would place a task on the prosecutor which
would be impossible to perform.
Professor Wigmore would accept the distinction between the natural
person and the artificial entity but add to it the clinching fact that the cor-
poration can act only by written records. Our highest court has apparently
a State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in
the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and
whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and
papers for that purpose." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906).
42. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
43. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Pub. Co., 174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919
(1921) ; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 98 Miss. 159, 53 So. 489 (1910).
44. An excellent illustration of the fusion of these two views is Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906).
45. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944), (labor unions).
46. 8 WIGmOaE, EVIDENCE § 2259a (3d ed. 1940).
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Denial of the privilege to corporations is not .difficult to accept when we
consider the policies underlying the privilege. Nor is it difficult to see that the
corporation cannot assert the privilege of its officers on the ground that the
documents might tend to incriminate them. The privilege is personal to the
witness and may not be asserted for the benefit of another.48
But should not an officer of a corporation be privileged from the com-
pulsory production of documents that not only may tend-to show corporate
guilt but also reflect his complicity in the transaction? The English courts
have allowed him to assert the privilege, 49 but the American courts are in
almost universal accord that he may not rely on his personal privilege in such
a situation. 50 The reason is that they are not his private papers but are cor-
porate documents and as to such documents no privilege exists; and further,
that in assuming the duties of a corporate officer, he accepts the conditions
incidental to it--one of which is production of corporate documents when
required by lawful process.5'
There was some indication in the earlier cases that a corporate officer
could refuse to produce corporate documents if the corporate misconduct
was so tied in with his own as to amount virtually to his own acts. This was
indicated in an early Michigan case, 52 but the statements made were unneces-
sary to the decision of the case. A lower federal court in Ex.parte Chapman 5
held that a corporate officer might refuse to produce corporate books if fhd
"
acts reflected therein were virtually his own. This case might have' turned
on the question of the breadth of the subpoena duces tecum. While it has
47. "The reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional privilege to natural
individuals acting in their own private capacity is clear.... The greater portion of
evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually to be found
in the official records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of privilege to
be throvn around the impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many
federal and state laws would be impossible. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700
(1944).
48. Hale. v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90 (1906);
Commonwealth v. Southern Express Co., 160 Ky. 1, 169 S.W. 517 (1914).
49. Rex v. Heydon, 1 BI. W. 351, 96 Eng. Rep. 195 (1762); Rex v. Purnell, 1
WI. B1. 37, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (1748) ; Rex v. Cornelius, 2 Strange 1210, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133
(1744) ; Regina v. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927, 92 Eng. Rep. 119 (1703).
50. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Dreier v. United States, 221
U.S. 394 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); McAlister v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 90 (1906) ; Ex parte Bott., 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N.E. 2d 918 (1946) ; Bleakley
v. Schlesinger, 294 N.Y. 312, 62 N.E. 2d 85 (1945) ; Commonwealth v. Southern Express
Co., 160 Ky. 1, 169 S.W. 517 (1914) ; Burnett v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 639, 129 Pac. 1110
(1913).
51. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911) ; Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 294 N.Y. 312, 62 N.E. 2d 85 (1945).
52. In re Moser, 138 Mich. 302, 101 N.W. 588, 593 (1904).
53. 153 Fed. 371 (D. Idaho 1907).
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not been expressly overruled, its effect as authority has been nullified by later
decisions. It was a result of a misconception of the holding in Hale v. Henkcl
-there an immunity statute was involved and it was not unnatural to as-
sume that but for the statute Hale might have asserted his privilege.5 4 The
Supreme Court of Nevada was faced with the identical problem the same year
and in an attampt to distinguish the Chapman case arrived by implication at
the result that a corporate officer could claim the privilege. 5
Wilsm v. United States 66 involved the validity of a subpoena duces tecum
issued to the corporation and the right of the officer to refuse to produce
the documents on the ground that they might incriminate him. The Court
recognized that an 'individual could. not be required to produce his private
papers but pointed out that corporation records signed by its president were
as much the documents of the corporation as were its minute books. The
fact that they were in the officer's possession or custody was immaterial.
The nature of 'the documents and not the capacity in which they were held
was determinative. The officer held the documents "subject to the corporate
duty." If it were oth'erwise the state's visitorial power would be seriously
hampered. .The Court pointed out that to permit Wilson to assert the privilege
would not be a recognition of it but an unwarranted extension of the privi-
lege.
Later cases have pointed out that it is immaterial if the individual is
the legal custodian or merely in possession of the documents. Similarly, it is
immaterial if he is legal owner of the records-the right to compulsory pro-
duction is determined by the nature of the documents and not by title thereto. 7
Although a much closer case, the fact that an individual is owner of
all the stock of a corporation is immaterial.58 In United States v. Hoyt 59
such an individual was not permitted to claim the privilege. "The fact that
it was ...his corporate alter ego, does not render the principle inap-
plicable. ... The corporate nonconductability is as effectual in this situation
as the defendant undoubtedly expected it-to be in the event of civil claims
against him." 60
A still closer case is presented when individual defendants are required
to produce the corporate records and also required .t authenticate them. Such
54. See Mr. Justice- McKenna dissenting in- Wilson y. UnitgdStates, 221 U.S. 361, 390(1911). ". . .
55. Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737,'741-2 (1§67).
56. 221 U.S.- 361 (1911). U:S. WS
57. Grant v. United States,- 227 U.S.,74 (19i3); Wheeler,-V."fnited States, 226 U.S.
478 (1913).
58. Grant v. United States, 227 U:S. 74 (1913) (6 jpliction) ; United States V.
Hoyt, 53 F. 2d 881 (S.DN:Y'1931).: .
59. 53 F. 2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931Y..
60. Id. at 884-885.
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a procedure was upheld in United" States v: Austin Bagley Corp.; q1 in spite
of the fact that the United States Supreme Court had previously said that
corporate officers' "may decline to utter upon the witness stand a single self-
incriminating word. They. may demand that. any accusation against them in-
dividually be established without the aid of their oral testimony .... , 62 The
court recognized that this presented a borderline case by saying, "While...
-there is here a possible, if tenuous; distiiction, we think the greater includes
the less, and that, since the production can be forced, it may be made effective
:by compelling the producer to declare that the documents are genuine ...
[T] estimony auxiliary to the production is as unprivileged as the documents
'themselves. By accepting the office of custodian the holder not only-.exposes
'himself to- producing the documents, but to make their use possible without
-requiring other proof than his own." 63
Thus it is apparent that the corporate officer stands in no better posi-
tion than the corporation. When demand is made by lawful process, he may
be required to produce the documents although their contents may incriminate
him. It is immaterial whether or not he is the custodian-nor does it matter
.if he has title to the documents or is owner of all the stock in a corporation.
-He must produce the corporate records, if in his possession, and, if need be,
!authenticate them to make the production effective.
UNIxcoRPoRATED AssoCIATIONS
- In determining the scope of the privilege the courts have said. that an
'individual may assert the privilege and that a corporation cannot. These views
hav become fairly crystallized. In dealing with-group activity-between these
extremes, it was natural that the courts would look to these settled princi-
ples for analogy. Partnership activity naturally fell on the individual side of
the ledger. But activity by unincorporated associations presented a more
perplexing problem. Situations involving these associations were slow in reach-
-ing the courts. The early cases involving unincorporated associations came up
under such circumstances that they could be disposed of without defining the
scope of the privilege as to such organizations, 64 or arose under statutes
61. 31 F. 2d 229 (C.C.A. 2d 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 .-(1929). See also
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 61 (C.C.A. 4th 1944) where requir-
ing defendants to identify corporate records was upheld accompanied by a cautionary note
that "it is obvious that the practice of calling individual defendants to the stand in a
criminal case is a dangerous one which should be employed only with scrupulous regard
for their constitutional rights." Id. at 67.
62. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911).
63. United States v.' Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F. 2d 229, 234 (C.C.A. 2d 1929),
cert denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
64. Brown v. United States, 276. U.S. 134, 143 (1928). Brown was secretary pf an
unincorporated association and the Court expressly found it unnecessary to determine the
scope of the privilege inasmuch as -lie refused to produce the documents. -But see Corretjer
v. Draughon, 8 8F. 2d 116, 118 (C.C.A. 1st 1937) where it is indicated that the secretary
• 635
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that rendered the association subject to being proceeded against as a legal en-
tity.
65
However, when an -individual who described himself as an "assistant
supervisor" appeared with labor union records in response to a subpoena
duces tecum and refused to surrender them to the grand jury on the ground
that they might incriminate him, the time for decision was at hand. The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit felt that his refusal .was justified
.if he were a member of the union. 66 The government pressed the analogy
between corporations and labor unions, but the court felt that a labor union
was quite different in that it does not derive its existence from a charter from
the government as does a corporation, and therefore, there is no reserved
visitorial power as in the case of corporations. "Its books and records are not
of public or even semi-public character. They are the private documents of
the union members who had they so chosen, did not need to keep records in the
first instance.... For the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination
the members of the union are in the same position as ordinary individuals
who maintain books and records of their transactions." 67
But the Supreme Court felt that whether or not the witness was a
member of the union was immaterial.68 The Court referred to the privilege as
"essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals," and pointed
out that it should be limited to its historical purpose. That the state did not
have reserved visitorial power over such groups was recognized but Mr.
Justice Murphy pointed out that mechanical comparisons were not determina-
tive. "The test , . . is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances
that a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
represent the purely private or personal interests of the constituents, but
rather to embody their common or group interests only." 69
The Court limited itself to the precise question before it-that is, whether
or not a member of a labor union could refuse to submit its documents as
evidence on the ground that they might tend to incriminate him and decided
that the union official could not so refuse. To that extent the question is no
longer an open-one, but there may be voluntary associations of a character
so personal that its members may assert their personal privilege against the
of a Puerto Rican political party would be privileged in refusing to turn them over to
the grand jury. The case was, however, decided on the defendant's open defiance
of the court order to produce them.
65. Davis v. S.E.C., 109 F. 2d 6 (C.C.A. 7th 1940) (Securities Act of 1933), Cer.
denied, 309 U.S. 687 (1940) ; United States v. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. IlL
1941) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
66. United States v. White, 137 F. 2d 24 (C.C.A. 3d 1943) (2-1 decision).
67. Id. at 26.
68. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
69. Id. at 700.
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production of the group documents. It is submitted, however, that the ques-
tion is virtually closed. As has been said about Mr. Justice Murphy's test:
"Such a test would be met by most voluntary associations of any impor-
tance." 70
PUBLIC AND QUASI-PUBLIC RECORDS
A. Public Records
"Public Record" may be defined as a written memorial made by a
public officer authorized by law to. perform that function and intended
to serve as evidence of something written, said, or done.7' Such records are,
by their nature, available for inspection for all lawful purposes, and their
custodian cannot refuse to produce these records on the ground that they con-
tain evidence which tends to incriminate him. One of the most-quoted cases
on this subject arose in England and held that a vestry clerk who is called
as a witness cannot, on the ground that it may incriminate him, object to
producing the vestry book which the law required him to keep.
72
The courts, in denying claims of privilege against self-incrimination,
have called some items public records which hardly fit within the above
definition, although they may be within the "spirit" of it. Thus, the Minne-
sota court has said that records of bank deposits were to a certain extent of a
public nature, in that they pertained to people's deposits.7 3 The case of People
v. Coombs74 involved a coroner who made fictitious reports of inquests in
order to collect more money from the exercise of his office. H , had a num-
ber of reports lying around his office which he had made out, but had not
placed among his official records. The court held that such reports must he
produced as aganist a claim of privilege, saying that such were public
records-they were public on their face and were in a public office in the
custody of a clerk paid by the city. The Kentucky court has stated that a
tariff sheet which the law required to-be posted in the railroad station is not
a private paper.
7 5
The reason for denying a claim of privilege of a public official in so far
as the records of his office are concerned is probably best set forth by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. This court stated that such documents belong to
the office and not to the officer; they are the property of the state and not the
citizen and are in no sense private memoranda.
76
70. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 528 (1946).
71. 3 BouviER's LAw DICrIONARY 2843 (3d rev., 8th ed. 1914).
72. Bradshaw v. Murphy, 7 Car. & P. 612, 173 Eng. Rep. 269 (Ex. 1836).
73. State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N.W. 913 (1905).
74. 158 N.Y. 532, 53 N.E. 527 (1899).
75. L.&N.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 239, 51 S.W. 167 (1899).
76. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 865 (Va. 1874).
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* B. Quasi-Public Records
Suppose that a statite of State A provides that all druggists must keep
a" r&ord of all sales of certain types of drugs, such records to be subject to
inspection by designated persons. If X, a druggist, is indicted for the unlawful
sale of drugs, may this record of his sales be placed in evidence against him
over his protest that such introduction is forcing him to give evidence against
himself in a criminal proceeding? The answer is yes. Such records are re-
quired by law to be kept, and X has no privilege to withhold their production."
7
Records which are required by law to be kept in order that there may
be suitable information of transactions which are appropriate subjects of
governmental regulation, and enforcement of restrictions validly established
are called quasi-public records.78 From a practical point of view, the chief
difference between public and quasi-public records, in so far as the question
of self-incrimination is concerned, would seem to be a matter of definition,
for quasi-public records must be surrendered to the proper authority for
inspection on demand, regardless of the evidence contained therein, just as
public records must be surrendered. 79 The courts have not always been
careful to distinguish between the two, sometimes denominating either class as
public.80 There are instances which involve records which are hard to classify
as either to the exclusion of the other.8 '
-Suppose that the statute of State A, in addition to requiring a record of
sales, also provided that inspecting officers should be allowed, on demand, to
inspect the account books and records of the druggist in order to check the
accuracy of the sales record. Does such a provision eliminate the druggist's
claim of privilege against self-incrimination? The New York Court of Appeals
held that such a provision was not valid in a statute which required a broker
to keep specified records and allow his books of account to be inspected for
the purpose of enforcing a stamp tax.82 The court stated that since the statute
provided a penalty for tax evasion, the sequel to the examination of the
broker's books was penalties and criminal prosecution. And therefore the
attempt to secure evidence from the broker by examining his books of ac-
77. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; State v. Farnum, 73 S.C. 165,
:53 S.E. 83 (1905); State v. Donovan, 10 N.D. 203, 86 N.W. 709 (1901). See also State
v. Pence, 173 Ind. 99, 89 N.E. 488 (1909), where the court interpreted a statute requiring
*druggists to keep records of liquor sales for one year as requiring only the keepign of
the records, and held, that such statute did not require the druggist to produce the
records pursuant to subpoena, since the statute made no provision for inspection.
78. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) for discussion of the classifica-
tion of public and quasi-public records, and the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to such classification.
79. Wilson v. United Sttes, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
80. E.g., State v. Donovan, 10 N.D. 203, 86 N.W. 709 (1901).
81. For instance, what should we call the records kept by the dispenser in a state-
owned liquor store? The South Carolina Supreme Court called such records public. State
v. Farnum, 73 S.C. 165, 53 S.E. 83 (1905).
82. People v. Reardon; 197 N.Y. 236, 90 N.E. 829 (1910).
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count was, in reality, compelling him to give evidence against, himself. A
federal district court in Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan held that a pro-
vision in the Internal Revenue Code which required that the taxpayer permit
his business records to be inspected for the purpose of checking the accuracy
of his tax return could not compel the taxpayer to permit inspection of his
books when he claimed that such an inspection might disclose incriminating
evidence, because to compel production of the books under such circumstances
would be a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.83
But whether the two foregoing decisions are entitled to much, if any'
weight at the present time is a matter of conjecture, at least in so far as the
federal courts are concerned. The case of Bowles v. Insel 8 4 held that when the
law required X to keep certain records, the records were not private, but
public, or quasi-public, and the mere fact that they were records of the sort
which a private person ordinarily keeps with regard to private business trans-,
actions did not detract from their public character. The constitutional guaran-
ties protecting private records have no application to public or quasi-public,
records. In view of the tremendous expansion of federal regulation of busi-
ness in the past fifteen years, it seems inevitable that some of the records
which the law requires to be kept for enforcement purposes should also be
the records which the businessman keeps in the normal course of business.
Several recent cases did not involve an objection that the records were of the
type normally kept by a man engaged in business, although if there were a
valid objection to surrender of the records on this ground, it would 8seem
that it would have been made.85 It is possible that the difference between a pro-
vision, such as that in the Sullivan case, that private records shall be subnmitted;
for inspection, and a regulation which requires the keeping of~certain records,.
as did the regulation under scrutiny in the Insel case is 0 -sufficient-.difference
to make the latter records .quasi-public, while the recbrds'which- need only
be submitted- for inspectioniretain their private charactenzXve.'have, however,
no authority to indicate that such is the distinction: between 'the two cases.
The Interstate Commerce.Act contains a provisiofi for immtinity of a
witness from criminal prosecution resulting from certain testimony -which he"
is compelled to give by the terms of the Act, 86 and this provision.,has been
incorporated into some later acts,* such as the act creating the Offi . of Price
83..Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1923). The
case of Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. 2d 1, 8 (C.C.A. 5th 1934), contains
dicta to the effect that one required to keep production and shipment records- for.govern-
ment inspection might assert a privilege to withhold a particular portion of his, records.
84. 148 F. 2d 91 (C.C.A. 3d 1945).
85. E.g., United States, v. Shapiro, 159 F. 2d.890 (C.C.A. 2d 1947). Bowles v. Seitz,
62 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. Tenn. 1945). 1 !
86. 27 STA-. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C.A. 46 (1929). The decision in Brown v: Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896) contains an inteqpretation of this provision:..,
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Administration.8 7 However, this provision has been interpreted as granting
immunity only to testimony which would otherwise be privileged, and there-
fore does not apply to evidence gained from inspection of the records which
the law requires to be kept.
88
Suppose that a statute of State A reqqires X to keep certain records, such
records to be subject to inspection for the purposes of tax collection. Then if X
is indicted for obtaniing money by false pretenses, or for some other crime
which bears no relation to tax collection, may such records be placed in evi-
dence against him on the ground that they are quasi-public records despite
X's claim that introduction of such records is forcing him to self-incrimina-
tion? There seems to be a scarcity of cases directly bearing on this question,
and any answer given at the present time would seem to be no more than
an expression of opinion. On the one hand, we have the consideration that
the records, being required by law, acquire a character which is different
from that of private records which are subject to X's claim of privilege. Qp-
posed to this consideration, we have the argument that the records were re-
quired to be made available for inspection for a particular purpose, and that
the records lost their private character with regard to that purpose only, and
should be subject to claims of privilege as private records in so far as purposes
other than tax collection are concerned.
BANKRUPTCY
A. Schedules of Property
Suppose that X becomes hopelessly insolvent and wishes to take ad-
vantage of the Bankruptcy Act, 89 or his creditors force him into the bank-
ruptcy court. X will find that the Bankruptcy Act requires him to file a sched-
ule with the court which lists his assets and liabilities, indicates his creditors
and the security they hold, and certain other information. Suppose, further,
that X has recently acquired some property on credit from Y by painting for
Y a more rosy picture of his (X's) financial status than was true in fact. If
Y has X indicted for obtaining property by false pretenses, or some other
crime as to which the schedules might be important evidence, may the schedules
of X be obtained from the bankruptcy court for use in evidence against him
over X's objection that he is being forced to give evidence against himself ?
This question made trouble for the courts in their early interpretations
87. 56 STAT. 30 (1942), 50 U.S.C.A. App. 922g (1944).
88. United States v. Shapiro, 159 F. 2d 890 (C.C.A. 2d 1947) ; Bowles v. Seitz, 62 F
Supp. 773 (W.D. Tenn. 1945). Bowles v. Chu Mang Poo, 58 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal.
1945) is not necessarily contra, since the court there found a waiver of any privilege
which the defendants might assert, and did not decide whether or not the defendants
were entitled to a claim of privilege.
89. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1927).
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of the Act. Section 25 of the Act 90 required the bankrupt to attend the first
meeting of his creditors, examine the correctness of claims filed against his
estate and to give certain other information. Subsection 8 of § 25 (Subsec. 9
of the present, amended Act) required the schedules. Subsection 9 (Subsec.
10 of the present Act) provided that when present at the first meeting of his
creditors, and at such other times as the court shall order, the bankrupt shall
submit to an examination regarding his property, "but no testimony given
by him shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding." 91
Did subsection 9 mean that the schedules required by subsection 8 could not
be used in a criminal proceeding against the bankrupt?
The courts were not faced squarely with this question until after 1910
because it was found that the schedules were within the protection of § 860
of the Revised Code.92 Cohen v. United- States, 93 decided in 1909, held that
the schedules were protected by § 860 of the Code, and also that subsection 9
of the Bankruptcy Act forbade their use in criminal proceedings against the
bankrupt. However, § 860 was repealed in 1910 94 and the question of the
use of the schedules in criminal proceedings against the bankrupt came before
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1913. The Court decided 95 that
the immunity provisions of subsection 9 referred only to testimony given under
the particular subsection and did not protect a bankrupt against the use of
the schedules which were required by a different subsection. The Court ex-
plained that it was reasonable for Congress to distinguish between schedules,
which could be prepared at leisure and scrutinized by the bankrupt, and the
oral testimony required by subsection 9 in providing for immunity. This
case seems to have settled the question.96 Since the Supreme Court has thus
interpreted the meaning of the statute, there would seem to be no reason why
the state courts would not also allow the schedules to be used in evidence against
the bankrupt in state criminal proceedings, 97 if the bankruptcy court will
release them to state authorities.
Suppose that before X has filed his schedule in. bankruptcy, he has been
90. 30 STAT. 548 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 25 (Supp. 1947).
91. Id. at subsec. 10. This provision was subsec. 9 of the original Act, and was
amended by 52 STAT. 847 (1938).
92. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30 (C.C.A. 1st 1908). REV. STAT. § 860
(1875), 15 STAT. 37 (1868) provided: "No pleading of a paKty, nor any discovery or
evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding... shall be
given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property or estate, in any
court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any
penalty or forfeiture: .
93. 170 Fed. 715 (C.C.A. 4th 1909).
94. 36 STAT. 352 (1910).
95. Ensign v. Commonwealth, 227 U.S. 592 (1913).
96. Accord, Optner v. United States, 13 F. 2d 11 (C.C.A. 6th 1926); Slakoff v.
United States,-8 F. 2d 9 (C.C.A. 3d 1925).
97. Contra: State v. Drew, 110 Minn. 247, 124 N.W. 1091 (1910), in which the
court held the schedules inadmissible and made a distinction between a voluntary pro-
ceeding and an involuntary proceeding.
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indicted or fears an indictment. If he believes that there is certain informa-
tion about his property which might be used in a criminal proceeding against
him, may he omit such information from his schedule? The answer is yes-
there is no privilege against the use of the schedules against him, but he has
the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
preparing his schedules. Before filing the schedule, the bankrupt may elimifiate
therefrom such matter as he honestly believes might be used against him in a
criminal case, although, as in all claims of the privliege, the reasonableness of
the apprehension must satisfy the bankruptcy court. 98 If the bankrupt does
not assert his privilege at the time of filing the schedules, they become ad-
missions of fact and are available for use in evidence against him after they
are filed.99
An interesting aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination, which
should be noticed at this point is, that in order for a witness to claim the
privilege, the evidence must be incriminating under the law of the jurisdic-
tion which is seeking to compel the answer. Thus the fact that a witness under
examination in a federal court claims that his testimony would indicate that
he is guilty of a violation of a state law 'of a sister state will not justify his
claim of the privilege, according to several Supreme Court opinions.100 In
United States v. Murdock 101 the Court reasoned that it could not be pre-
sumed that a prosecution under a foreign jurisdiction would take place, and
the danger was too unsubstantial and remote for the courts to consider it.
B: Books of Account and Records Pertaining to the Bankrupt Estate
May a bankrupt refuse to surrender books of account and papers pertain-
ing to his estate to the bankruptcy court because such documents contain evi-
dence which tends to incriminate him? The answer today, seems to be an
unqualified no.
Some of the earlier cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act indicated
that the courts were willing to recognize a privilege against the production
of books and papers containing incriminating information about the bank-
rupt. In 1899 a federal district court decided 102 that the bankrupt must pro-
dlce his papers despite a claim of privilege, but the court based its holding
on the fact that the proceedings were voluntary, and that the bankrupt had
98. In re Naletsky, 280 Fed. 437 (D. Conn. 1921).
99. Carlinsky v. United States, 54 F. 2d 889 (C.C.A. 10th 1931), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 549 (1932). As to whether a bankrupt may refuse to answer questions concerning
property which he has listed in his schedule- see Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71
(1920) and In re Tobias, 215 Fed. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
100. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372
(1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
101. United States v. Murdock,'284 U.S. 141 (1931).
102. In re Sapiro, 92 Fed. 340 (E.D. Wis. 1899).
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-thereby waived his privilege. A case in 1902103 held that the privilege of the
bankrupt must be recognized and that he need not produce his papers when
he claimed a privilege against self-incrimination, while in 1905 a brief opinion
in a- district court stated that the books must be brought before the court
for the court to decide whether they must be surrendered or not.
10 4
But the Supreme Court has since decided the question against the bank-
rupt. In 1911 the Court decided that the question was not one of compelling
the bankrupt to be a witness against himself, but of surrendering property
which he was no longer entitled to keep.10 5 The Court stated that- title to
the books vests in the trustee by express terms of the Bankruptcy Act 106 and
the bankrupt can not withhold possession of' what he no longer owns on the
ground that otherwise he might be punished. Two years later the Court
bolstered this holding. In Johnson v. United States 107. the Court explained
that a person is privileged from producing evidence against himself, not
from its production, and that a party is not privileged to withhold the docu-
ments, although they contain incriminating evidence, when the title has passed
from him to the trustee. The privilege is personal and does not follow the
documents after the law has transferred ownership of them. Later federal
decisions affirm the opinion that once a party comes before the bankruptcy
court, he must surrender his books and papers to the disposition of tlhe court.
Further, he loses all claim of privilege pertaining to these documents, and
they may be placed in evidence against him in criminal proceedings, both in
federal and state courts.10 8 Dier v. Benton 109 contains the statement that the
only restriction on the use of the documents in state courts is that the per-
mission of the bankruptcy court must be obtained, such court having a dis-
cretion as to their release, subject to the considerations of comity.
The relatively recent case of United States v. Hoyt 110 was a rather per-
plexing decision. In this case a creditors' agreement had been reached and
the bankrupt moved the court to return his books, claiming that if they were
left where the district attorney could reach them, the petitioner's rights under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution would be
violated. The court held, however, that the privilege against self-incrimination
was a personal one, and did not follow the documents, and thus the petitioner
was deemed to have waived any objection to the use of the papers until such
time as they were returned to him. If the court in this case intended to hold
103. In re Kanter, 117 Fed. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
104. In re Hess, 134 Fed. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1905).
105. In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911).
106. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (Supp. 1947).
107. 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
108. Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34
(1924).
109. 262 U.S. 147 (1923).
110. 53 F. 2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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that, although the bankruptcy proceedings had terminated, the bankrupt had
waived any privilege in connection with his business books and papers, then
it is hard-to understand how the taking of property from an individual by
operation of law could amount to a waiver of anything on his part. However,
if the court merely was holding that it will keep the bankrupt's estate before
it until it decides to terminate the proceedings at an appropriate time, then the
decision can be justified by the fact that the title to the documents is in the
trustee, and the bankrupt has no right to the documents until the court returns
them to him.
However, the Hoyt case does not disturb the conclusion that the bank-
rupt is required to surrender the documents pertaining to his estate to the
bankruptcy court, and having done so, loses any immunity against their pro-
duction or use against him in a criminal proceeding.
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